Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy
Volume 14
Issue 3 Spring

Article 3

Spring 2019

Shelby County and Local Governments: A Case
Study of Local Texas Governments Diluting
Minority Votes
Sydnee Fielkow

Recommended Citation
Sydnee Fielkow, Shelby County and Local Governments: A Case Study of Local Texas Governments Diluting Minority Votes, 14 Nw. J. L. &
Soc. Pol'y. 348 (2019).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njlsp/vol14/iss3/3

This Note or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy by an authorized editor of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Copyright 2019 by Sydnee Fielkow
Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy

Volume 14 (Spring 2019)

Shelby County and Local Governments: A Case
Study of Local Texas Governments Diluting
Minority Votes
By Sydnee Fielkow*
INTRODUCTION
And the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the
weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the
free exercise of the franchise.1
In the 2013 case, Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court nullified the federal
government’s authority to preemptively intervene to prevent discriminatory changes to
local election laws.2 Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) previously
required state and local governments to submit proposed election law changes based on
their history of discriminatory voting laws.3 Section 4(b) prohibited governments with a
history of discriminatory voting practices from enacting new election laws without first
obtaining preclearance of the plan from the Department of Justice (DOJ). Unfortunately,
in Shelby County, the Supreme Court held that Section 4(b) was outdated and that the
DOJ could no longer enforce that provision.4 Without this provision of the VRA, local
governments are no longer required to submit proposed changes in election law to the
Attorney General for review, regardless of whether they had discriminated against
minority voters in the past.5 As a result of this change, local voters are now vulnerable to
discriminatory practices.
Following the Court’s decision in Shelby County, several states acted quickly to
change their election laws.6 In Texas, multiple counties swiftly enacted provisions and
laws that would prevent minorities from having equal access to the ballot. While the
Texas state government passed statewide legislation that restricted minorities’ ability to
reach the ballot, local governments threatened voting rights in other significant ways.
*
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1
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
2
570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
3
See id. (citing 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b) (2012)).
4
570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
5
See 52 U.S.C. §§ 10303–10304 (2012).
6
See 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012); see also Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 578 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Just as
buildings in California have a greater need to be earthquake-proofed, places where there is greater racial
polarization in voting have a greater need for prophylactic measures to prevent purposeful race
discrimination.”).
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Numerous local governments in Texas quickly created at-large election plans. These
plans, though perhaps facially neutral, are used to dilute the voting strength of minority
voters. Without the preemptive protections that were struck down in Shelby County, these
local Texas governments, that Congress previously determined had a history of voter
discrimination, can now pass election legislation without approval from the federal
government. Today, voters must challenge these discriminatory practices only after they
take effect. One way to do so is under Section 2 of the VRA.
This Comment provides an account of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) and how local
voting rights legislation has changed since the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby
County v. Holder. Part I analyzes the Voting Rights Act, the provisions at question in
Shelby County, and how VRA litigation broadly has changed since this case. Part II
provides an account of at-large elections and how they can dilute minority votes. Finally,
while most scholarship focuses on voting laws at the federal or state level “[d]espite . . .
robust activity on the local level,” 7 Part III focuses on three Texas cities—Pasadena,
Beaumont, and Galveston—to understand how vulnerable local voters fought back in the
wake of Shelby County.
I.THE VRA AND SHELBY COUNTY: HOW VOTER DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION HAS
DRASTICALLY CHANGED
On August 6, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the VRA into law, nearly
one hundred years after Congress ratified the Fifteenth Amendment.8 President Johnson
and Congress sought to remove the barriers preventing racial minorities from
participating in government through the VRA.9 The VRA prohibits states from imposing
any “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure . . .
which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race or color.” 10 Congress expanded the law in 1975 to apply to
language minorities as well.11
This Comment focuses on three provisions of the VRA: Sections 2, 4(b), and 5.
Under Section 2 of the VRA, all governments are prohibited from diluting the power of

7

Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under Local Law, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1039, 1041 (2017).
See Voting Rights Act of 1965, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/black-history/voting-rights-act
(last updated Nov. 9, 2009). The Fifteenth Amendment mandated that the right to vote “shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.” U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
9
See Voting Rights Act of 1965, supra note 8; see also President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the
Signing of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Aug. 6, 1965), https://www.c-span.org/video/?326896-1/votingrights-act-1965-speech-bill-signing (“This [Voting Rights] Act flows from a clear and simple wrong. It’s
only purpose is to right that wrong. Millions of Americans are denied the right to vote because of the color
of their skin.”).
10
52 U.S.C. § 10301(a).
11
See Press Release, Office of the White House Press Sec’y, Remarks of the President at the Signing of the
Voting Rights Act (Aug. 6, 1975), https://www.docsteach.org/documents/document/ford-voting-rights-act1975. Specifically, President Ford said that this expansion prohibits “discrimination against Spanishspeaking Americans, American Indians, Alaskan natives, and Asian Americans.” Id. The bill also allows
private citizens to bring claims of voter discrimination. Id.
8
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minority votes. 12 Section 5 requires certain state and local governments to gain
preclearance from the Department of Justice (DOJ) before changing election laws. 13
Section 4(b) contains a coverage formula to determine which state or local governments
must gain federal preclearance under Section 5. 14 President Johnson’s advice to states
wishing to remain free from federal oversight was simple: “Open your polling places to
all your people. Allow men and women to register and vote whatever the color of their
skin. Extend the rights of citizenship to every citizen of this land.”15 Unfortunately, in
Shelby County, the Court determined that Section 4(b) of the VRA was outdated, thus
effectively nullifying Section 5’s preemptive power over discriminatory election law
changes. 16 The next section outlines Section 5’s protection, reviews the formula in
Section 4(b) at issue in Shelby County, identifies what Section 2 protects, and
demonstrates how the Shelby County decision changed the course of voting rights
legislation.
A.

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act

Prior to Shelby County v. Holder, Section 5 of the VRA required states and local
districts with a history of discrimination seek approval from the federal government
before making any changes to voting laws and practices, which is known as the
“preclearance” requirement. 17 The jurisdictions subject to Section 5 preclearance are
those that the Section 4(b) coverage formula identified as discriminatory. 18 To meet the
preclearance requirement, these jurisdictions could submit their proposed changes to the
DOJ or to a federal court of three judges.19 After receiving a proposal to change voting
laws, the Attorney General had sixty days to respond, either approving the plan, rejecting
the plan, or requesting more information.20 The DOJ challenged an average of twentyeight proposed voting plans per year between 1965 and 2012.21
Section 5 prohibits laws that have “the purpose [or] . . . the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,” or language minority group. 22
Here, “purpose” refers to “any discriminatory purpose.”23 Section 5 places the burden of
proof on state or local governments to demonstrate that the election changes were “not
12

52 U.S.C. § 10301.
52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2012).
14
52 U.S.C. § 10303(b) (2012), held unconstitutional by Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
15
President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress: The American Promise (Mar. 15, 1965),
http://www.lbjlibrary.org/lyndon-baines-johnson/speeches-films/president-johnsons-special-message-tothe-congress-the-american-promise.
16
Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 557. As noted later on, federal judges do have the authority to require districts
to obtain preclearance prior to implementing changes to voting law in certain situations. See infra note 150.
17
52 U.S.C. § 10304.
18
See id. § 10304(a). As discussed later, the Court in Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 557, found that the
coverage formula in § 4(b) is outdated.
19
See 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a).
20
See id.
21
See Charles J. Durante, Diluting the Voting Rights Act: How the Supreme Court’s Conservative Majority
Upended Precedent and Ignored Congressional Intent to Empower Vote-Suppression, DEL. LAW., Fall
2016, at 22, 24.
22
52 U.S.C. § 10304(a) (emphasis added); see also 52 U.S.C. § 10303(f)(2) (2012), held unconstitutional
by Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
23
52 U.S.C. § 10304(c).
13
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motivated by a discriminatory purpose and will not have an adverse impact on minority
voters,” before the changes could be enacted. 24 Further, Section 5 protects minorities
against retrogressive effects, 25 as states must show that their proposed voting plan would
not have such an effect on minority communities.26 In 2006, Congress amended Section 5
to address how the VRA handles retrogressive effects. 27 After this amendment, states
must present evidence of the relative “ability [of the minority community] to elect
preferred candidates” in order to prove that a proposed plan will not have retrogressive
effects on minorities.28
This demonstrates that prior to the Shelby County decision, Section 5 protected
minority voters before any election law change could take effect. Jurisdictions with a
history of discrimination had the burden to prove their proposed plan had neither
discriminatory intent nor effect. Additionally, Section 5 gave the federal government
authority to preemptively block plans that would have retrogressive effects on minorities.
Though Section 5 survived Shelby County, the Court significantly limited its scope by
striking down Section 4(b), as is discussed below. Today as a result of Shelby County, the
federal government no longer has authority to preemptively reject proposed election
changes that have either discriminatory purpose or intent.
B.

Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act

Section 4(b) includes the coverage formula, which determines what jurisdictions
are subject to the Section 5 preclearance requirement.29 Section 4(b) provides that states
and districts are subject to federal preclearance if: (1) the Attorney General finds the
government maintained a voting test after November 1, 1964, or (2) the Director of the
Census finds that state officials registered less than 50 percent of the people of voting age
or less than 50 percent of the people of voting age voted in the November 1964
presidential election.30 The Attorney General and Director of the Census implemented

24

McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 247 (1984); see also NAACP LEGAL DEF. FUND, THE COST (IN TIME,
MONEY, AND BURDEN) OF SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT LITIGATION 1 (2017),
https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/uploads/Section-2-costs-08.13.18_1.pdf.
25
See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (finding that “the purpose of § 5 has always been to
insure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of
racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise”).
26
See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 462 (2003), superseded by statute as stated in Ala. Legislative
Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015) (“Congress passed the 2006 amendments [to § 5 of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965] in response to our attempt to define ‘retrogression’ in Georgia v. Ashcroft.”).
27
See H.R REP. NO. 109-478, at 70–71 (2006).
28
Id.; see also 52 U.S.C. § 10304(b).
29
52 U.S.C. § 10303(b) (2012), held unconstitutional by Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
30
Id. Voting tests included literacy tests, which tested a potential voter’s “ability to read and understand
English. . . . In practice, the[se] [tests] were used to disqualify immigrants and the poor, who had less
education. In the South, they were used to prevent African Americans from registering to vote.” Literacy
Tests, NAT’L MUSEUM OF AM. HIST., https://americanhistory.si.edu/democracy-exhibition/votevoice/keeping-vote/state-rules-federal-rules/literacy-tests (last visited May 19, 2019). For an example of a
literacy test, see Rebecca Onion, Take the Impossible “Literacy” Test Louisiana Gave Black Voters in the
1960s, SLATE (June 28, 2013, 12:30 PM), https://slate.com/human-interest/2013/06/voting-rights-and-thesupreme-court-the-impossible-literacy-test-louisiana-used-to-give-black-voters.html.
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similar measures in 1968 and 1972.31 Jurisdictions covered under Section 4(b) could “bail
out” of coverage if they proved they had not used voting tests in the last five years “for
the purpose or with the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race
or color.”32
Congress has reauthorized the VRA multiple times, most recently in 2006.
Congress did not change the coverage formula and instead chose to extend the existing
formula for fifteen more years in 2006.33 This demonstrates that Congress deemed the
coverage formula necessary to ensure fair voting practices in the United States and that
the formula did not need to be altered.
C.

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act

Section 2 allows private voters to enforce the public right to vote.34 The language
of Section 2 mirrors the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits states from denying or
abridging the right to vote based on “race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”35
Under Section 2(a), no government can enact an election law that denies or abridges “the
right of any citizens of the United States to vote on account of race or color” or because
he or she is a member of a language-minority group.36 Unlike Section 5, this prohibition
applies to all states, not just those states with a history of voter discrimination.37
Section 2(b) outlines what constitutes a violation of 2(a).38 A plaintiff can establish
a violation of Section 2(a) occurred if:
based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of
citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice.39
When reviewing a violation of Section 2(a), one of the many factors courts may consider
is how many members of a protected class have been elected to political office in a
specific jurisdiction.40
Section 2 also prohibits voting schemes that dilute minority votes, meaning a
minority citizen’s vote does not have the same weight as a white citizen’s vote.41 These
31

52 U.S.C. § 10303(b).
Id. § 10303(a).
33
See ARI BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT: THE MODERN STRUGGLE FOR VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA, 285
(2015).
34
Daniel P. Tokaji, Public Rights and Private Rights of Action: The Enforcement of Federal Election Laws,
44 IND. L. REV. 113, 138 (2010).
35
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
36
52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2012).
37
See id.
38
Id. § 10301(b).
39
Id.
40
See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 (1986) (finding that while there is no guarantee that minorities
will be elected to office, courts consider “[t]he extent to which members of a protected class have been
elected to office” to determine if there has been a § 2 violation).
41
52 U.S.C. § 10301.
32
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prohibited schemes include at-large elections in addition to other voting procedures such
as appointing officials for positions that were previously elected, moving polling places
to inconvenient locations, and closing polling locations. 42 While these procedures are
typically not facially discriminatory, the election plans often have discriminatory effects
on minority voters.43
The Court did not intend to eliminate Section 2 of the VRA in its Shelby County
decision.44 Even though Section 2 may still be used to challenge allegedly discriminatory
voter laws, these cases remain very difficult to prove and often require years of litigation,
as described in Part II. While plaintiffs can challenge election law changes, the laws may
still be in place for some time before a judge can issue a ruling, which is particularly
problematic when there are allegedly discriminatory laws in effect during elections.45 The
specific requirements for successfully proving a Section 2 violation will be discussed
later, but it is important to emphasize Section 2 allows for reactive litigation while
Section 5 gives the Attorney General power to proactively prevent laws with
discriminatory purpose or effect from being enacted.
D.

The Voting Rights Act and Shelby County v. Holder

While the VRA remains significant as one of the most expansive civil rights laws,
its reach was significantly curtailed when Shelby County v. Holder struck down Section
4(b) of the VRA.46 The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the formula used to
determine what counties are bound by the preclearance requirement was outdated and
therefore no longer constitutional.47 The Court based its decision on the fact that “things
have changed dramatically” 48 since the VRA was passed, ignoring the reality that the
increase in minority voter turnout in recent years was due in large part to the existence of
the VRA and its preclearance requirement.49 In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg argued that
by limiting the Voting Rights Act, the Court “terminate[d] the remedy that proved to be
best suited to block [voting] discrimination.”50
By striking down the coverage formula in Section 4(b) that determined which state
and local governments were subject to the preclearance requirement, the Court essentially
eliminated the ability of the federal government to proactively prevent discriminatory
state laws under Section 5.51 The formula was crucial for enabling the DOJ to challenge
42

NAACP LEGAL DEF. FUND, A PRIMER ON SECTIONS 2 & 3(C) OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, at 1-2 (2017),
https://perma.cc/8S2F-6HAG.
43
Id.
44
Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013).
45
See TOMAS LOPEZ, SHELBY COUNTY: ONE YEAR LATER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. at 2 (2014)
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Shelby_County_One_Year_Later.pdf.
46
See id. at 1.
47
See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 557.
48
Id.
49
Additionally, § 5 continued to block discriminatory voting laws until Shelby County. Six of the nine fully
covered states under the § 4 formula, including Texas, passed new legislation restricting voting from 2010
to 2013, as opposed to the one-third of states not covered by the preclearance requirement. See BERMAN,
supra note 33, at 277.
50
Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 560.
51
See id. at 531.
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discriminatory practices; without Section 4(b), no county is subject to the Section 5
preclearance requirement. Until Congress passes a new and updated test to replace
Section 4(b), Section 5 will remain ineffectual. Although some members of Congress are
currently gathering information to “address the Supreme Court’s concerns about that data
supporting Section 4 of the [VRA] and work toward the full implementation of Section
5,” Congress still has a long way before the VRA will be fully restored. 52 Today,
minority voters may rely on Section 2 to assert their right to vote. 53 But as discussed
below, this substantially increases the cost of vindicating that right.
When there are discriminatory changes at the state level that cause national
backlash and outrage, there are likely going to be more resources available to fight these
election practices.54 However, election law violations that occur at the local level may not
receive the same level of national attention and resources. While there was national
outrage when Texas moved forward with a statewide voter ID law, local changes did not
receive the same level of national outrage. This could be due to numerous reasons,
including the number of people these laws affect. Yet, these election law changes still
may have discriminatory effects on minority voters.
As it stands today, Section 5 of the VRA does not provide preventative support to
minority voters because Shelby County found the coverage formula in Section 4(b) to be
outdated. Without the coverage formula, the DOJ is unable to challenge discriminatory
practices under Section 5. But Section 2 remains a viable option to challenge election
laws, such as at-large elections, after they have gone into effect. Part II addresses how atlarge elections can be used to dilute the voting power of racial minorities.
II.USING AT-LARGE ELECTIONS TO DILUTE MINORITY VOTERS’ VOICES
Before the VRA, at-large elections or multimember districts were used to keep
legislators accountable for what happens to the entire voting population and “promote
good governance.” 55 This changed after the passage of the VRA. 56 Under at-large
52

Congress Traveling the Country to Hear Evidence of Voting Rights Violations, BLACKPRESSUSA (Apr.
13, 2019), https://www.blackpressusa.com/congress-traveling-the-country-to-hear-evidence-of-votingrights-violations/.
53
See NAACP LEGAL DEF. FUND, supra note 24, at 1.
54
On the same day that Shelby County was decided, Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott announced that a
voter-ID law previously prevented by the preclearance requirement would immediately be implemented.
See Ed Pilkington, Texas Rushes Ahead with Voter ID Law After Supreme Court Decision, GUARDIAN,
(June 25, 2013, 3:32 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/25/texas-voter-id-supreme-courtdecision. This declaration prompted immediate backlash and lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of
the law. In the consolidated case Veasey v. Perry, voter advocates challenged the voter-ID law. 29 F. Supp.
3d 896, 902 (S.D. Tex. 2014). This case has been in litigation since Shelby County, and on April 10, 2017,
the district court ruled that this law was enacted with discriminatory intent against minority voters in Texas.
See Texas NAACP v. Steen (Consolidated with Veasey v. Abbott), BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 21,
2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/legal-work/naacp-v-steen. The Texas voter-ID law being challenged,
SB 14, was originally created in 2011, but was challenged under § 5 of the VRA and struck down within a
year. See id. Challenging the law under § 2 has taken five years. See id. Most recently, on April 27, 2018,
the Fifth Circuit ruled that the voter-ID law may be implemented. Veasey v. Abbott, 888 F.3d 792, 804 (5th
Cir. 2018).
55
Sarah Childress, After Shelby, Voting-Law Changes Come One Town at a Time, PBS (Aug. 8, 2013),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/after-shelby-voting-law-changes-come-one-town-at-a-time/.
56
See id.
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election plans, “all voters cast their ballots for all candidates in the jurisdiction.” 57
Politicians began using these systems as a method of diluting the minority vote. 58 Atlarge systems can be used to discriminate against all minority groups, including racial,
ethnic, economic and political groups.59 When a city is divided into districts or wards,
some of these districts are likely to have a concentrated number of racial minority
voters.60 This concentration gives minorities who vote as a bloc an opportunity to elect
the representatives of their choice.61 However, when governments operate under an atlarge election, voters select at least one of their representatives through a majority vote.
This means that the majority voters will outnumber minority voters, allowing “the
political majority to elect all representatives of the district.”62 In other words, a white
majority that votes as a bloc will often elect candidates that represent only the white
majority.
A.

How At-Large Systems Are Created

When jurisdictions move to at-large elections, they also often eliminate one or
more districts, which keeps the number of representatives constant. For example, a city
moving from a 5-district system to three single-member districts and two at-large electors
(referred to as a 3-2 system) eliminates two districts. The three new districts also need to
be redrawn, which places them in a vulnerable position to the negative effects of
gerrymandering.63
The party in power “gerrymanders” when it draws district lines not to reflect
geography or neighborhoods, but instead to maximize that party’s political advantage.
The politicians in power often pack voters who favor the opposition into districts that the
opposing party is likely to win (referred to as “packing”) or crack those who will vote for
the opposition into many different districts so they constitute a minority (“cracking”). 64
When people in positions of power want to dilute minority votes, moving to an at-large
system allows them to both create seats elected by the majority as well as minimize the
impact of the minority votes by creating new districts using packing and cracking.
Gerrymandering is not discriminatory on its face; rather, there must be evidence of
discriminatory purpose or effect. 65 Gerrymandering and at-large elections are closely
related because jurisdictions may use gerrymandering efforts with discriminatory purpose
57

NAACP LEGAL DEF. FUND, AT-LARGE VOTING FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2014),
https://www.naacpldf.org/wp-content/uploads/At-Large-Voting-Frequently-Asked-Questions-1.pdf.
58
See id.
59
See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616 (1982).
60
See James Scott McClain, The Voting Rights Act and Local School Boards: An Argument for Deference
to Educational Policy in Remedies for Vote Dilution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 139, 140 (1988).
61
See id.
62
Rogers, 458 U.S. at 616.
63
Gerrymandering, a term coined in 1812, is named after Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry, who
created a redistricting plan—frequently referred to as a salamander because of its unique shape—that was
intended to give his party an advantage. See MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE FIGHT TO VOTE 37 (2016).
64
See Evan Hall, Texas Two Step: The Texas Legislature’s Mid-Decennial Redistricting Plan of 2003,
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, and Their Impact on the Future of the Political
Gerrymander, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 485, 487 (2007).
65
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993).
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or effect when creating an at-large election. As such, understanding how districts can be
broken up through gerrymandering to achieve voter dilution is important to at-large
elections.
B.

Bringing Claims Against At-Large Election Schemes under Section 2 of the VRA

After Congress passed the VRA in 1965, voters began challenging at-large voting
schemes under Section 2.66 The VRA prevented new at-large elections from taking place
through Section 5, and provided a method of relief under Section 2. The Supreme Court
has never ruled that all at-large elections are unconstitutional and has in fact found that
at-large plans “may not be considered per se violative of § 2” of the VRA.67 However, the
Court has found discrimination in individual cases. 68 In Thornburg v. Gingles, Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, stated that the Supreme Court “has long recognized
that multimember districts and at-large voting schemes may operate to minimize or
cancel out the voting strength of racial [minorities] in the voting population.”69
Before Shelby County, jurisdictions with a chronic history of discriminatory
election laws trying to implement at-large voting plans needed to seek preclearance under
Section 5. 70 Therefore, the Attorney General could reject plans that had either
discriminatory purpose or effect prior to the plan taking effect. 71 When at-large plans
were implemented, voters historically challenged them under Section 2. However, it can
be very difficult and expensive to prove that an at-large voting scheme has discriminatory
effects under Section 2.72
In Gingles, the Court created a two-step system for addressing a Section 2 claim.73
First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of vote dilution. To do so, the
challenger must prove that: (1) the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically
compact such that they could comprise a majority of the district voters; (2) the minority
group is politically cohesive; and (3) racially polarized voting exists so that it is likely
that whites would vote as a bloc to defeat candidates favored by minorities. 74 These three
factors are commonly known as the “Gingles factors.”75
After establishing the prima facie case, the court must consider “whether plaintiffs
have established that, ‘based on the totality of circumstances,’ minority voters ‘have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process
66

See NAACP LEGAL DEF. FUND, supra note 57.
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 (1986). In White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), the Supreme
Court held that the Texas multimember district was unconstitutional because it had a discriminatory effect
towards Mexican-Americans, as the plan “invidiously excluded Mexican-Americans from effective
participation in political life, specifically in the election of representatives to the Texas House of
Representatives.” Id. at 769. However, the Supreme Court has also upheld multimember districts when the
plaintiff is unable to prove that the district “unconstitutionally operate[s] to dilute or cancel the voting
strength of racial or political elements.” Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 144 (1971).
68
See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 47.
69
Id. (quoting Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966)).
70
52 U.S.C. § 10304 (2012).
71
Id.; see also City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 362 (1975).
72
See Durante, supra note 21; see also NAACP LEGAL DEF. FUND, supra note 24, at 1.
73
Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50–51.
74
Id. at 31, 50–51 (establishing that a “bloc” can occur when “a significant number of minority group
members usually vote for the same candidate”).
75
NAACP LEGAL DEF. FUND, supra note 42, at 2.
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and to elect representatives of their choice.’”76 Courts should then consider many factors
in the second step of the analysis.77 This part of the test is flexible, allowing courts to
consider factors they deem relevant to the particular case, including the history of the
particular jurisdiction being challenged. 78 Many courts consider widespread private
discrimination, or discriminatory acts by someone other than the government, as a factor
in Section 2 litigation.79
Unlike Section 5 claims, individuals must bring Section 2 claims after the
regulation is enacted. 80 This automatically creates a financial barrier to blocking laws
with allegedly discriminatory purposes or effects because Section 2 claims require
litigation, an expensive and often long process. 81 Litigating these claims can be time
consuming—it is common for these cases to last more than five years.82 Section 5 claims
place the burden of proof on the state or local government to prove to the Attorney
General that the election law change is non-discriminatory. Comparatively, Section 2
claims put the burden of proof on the plaintiff, often requiring intense labor to prove the
Gingles factors.83 Section 2 claims are also significantly more expensive than Section 5
claims; one town spent over $2 million defending Section 2 claims, while Section 5

76

Id.
A non-exhaustive list of factors can be found in the Senate Judiciary Committee’s report from the VRA’s
1982 amendments and includes: (1) “[T]he extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or
political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or
otherwise to participate in the democratic process”; (2) “the extent to which voting in the elections of the
state or political subdivision is racially polarized”; (3) “[t]he extent to which the state or political
subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements . . . or other voting
practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group”;
(4) “whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to” the candidate-slating process;
(5) “the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects
of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to
participate effectively in the political process”; (6) “whether political campaigns have been characterized
by overt or subtle racial appeals”; and (7) “the extent to which members of the minority group have been
elected to public office in the jurisdiction.” S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 206–07 (1982).
78
See generally LOPEZ, supra note 45.
79
See Patino v. City of Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667, 685 (S.D. Tex. 2017); see also
Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1407, 1418 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Marengo Cty.
Comm’n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1567 n.36 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating that “pervasive private discrimination should
be considered” in § 2 litigation “because such discrimination can contribute to the inability of blacks to
assert their political influence and to participate equally in public life”).
80
See generally Ellen D. Katz, Section 2 After Section 5: Voting Rights and the Race to the Bottom, 59
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1961, 1963 (2018).
81
See Brief for Joaquin Avila et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 16, Shelby County v.
Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (No. 12-96) (emphasizing that “Section 2 actions have become increasingly
complex and resource-intensive in recent years”).
82
See NAACP LEGAL DEF. FUND, supra note 24, at 5–6. For example, in Fayette County, Georgia, voters
battled a discriminatory at-large election for over five years. See id. at 5. Voters challenged Texas’s photoID law under § 2 for over six years. Id. at 6.
83
See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976). In one case, a town procured more than 340,000
pages of documents and deposed more than fifty people to meet its burden of proof. See NAACP LEGAL
DEF. FUND, supra note 24, at 2.
77
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claims only cost states an average of $500. 84 This demonstrates that challenging laws
under Section 2 takes more time, money, and labor than gaining preclearance approval
under Section 5.
At-large elections can have a discriminatory impact on minority voters and
challenging these schemes under Section 2 can be costly and burdensome for all parties.
Immediately after Shelby County, many local governmental bodies in Texas enacted atlarge elections that diluted the voting strength of racial minorities. Part III focuses on
three Texan cities that created at-large election schemes following Shelby County:
Pasadena, Beaumont, and Galveston. Pasadena was able to successfully bring a Section 2
challenge and should serve as a model for voters challenging at-large elections after
Shelby County. Beaumont voters did not bring a Section 2 claim but bringing one may
have improved their chances of success. Meanwhile in Galveston, voters failed to win
their Section 2 claim. These case studies highlight the challenges that voters face postShelby County, while also shining a light on a case that can serve as an example for
similarly situated voters.
III.CASE STUDIES OF AT-LARGE ELECTIONS
After the Shelby County decision in June 2013, many state and local governments
acted quickly to implement election changes that the DOJ could have originally blocked
under Section 5. Texas officials expressed their approval of the Shelby County decision
because the Court held that “preclearance under the Voting Rights Act was no longer
required in many states, including Texas.”85 On the same day that Shelby County was
decided, then-Attorney General of Texas Greg Abbott famously tweeted, “Eric Holder
can no longer deny #VoterID in #Texas after today’s #SCOTUS.” 86 Politicians began
passing election law changes after June 2013, often at the local level. In Texas, many
local governments passed election law changes that either were previously denied by the
federal government or would have been subject to the preclearance requirement. In the
words of the Supreme Court:
Texas has a long, well-documented history of discrimination that has
touched upon the rights of African-Americans and Hispanics to register, to
vote, or to participate otherwise in the electoral process. . . The history of
official discrimination in the Texas election process – stretching back to

See NAACP LEGAL DEF. FUND, supra note 24, at 3 (“Lawmakers in Charleston County, South Carolina,
spent $2 million unsuccessfully defending itself from a Section 2 claim. On the contrary, under Section 5, it
cost an average of $500 for states and localities to submit paperwork for preclearance of changes to voting
practices.”). See also Understanding the Benefits and Costs of Section 5 Pre-Clearance: Hearing Before
the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 20 (2006); Dale E. Ho, Voting Rights Litigation After Shelby
County: Mechanics and Standards in Section 2 Vote Denial Claims, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 675
(2014).
85
Patino v. City of Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667, 681 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
86
Greg Abbott (@GregAbbott_TX), TWITTER (June 25, 2013, 8:02 AM),
https://twitter.com/gregabbott_tx/status/349543005931311104.
84
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Reconstruction – led to the inclusion of the State as a covered jurisdiction
under Section 5 in the 1975 amendments to the Voting Rights Act.87
The following section is a case study of three Texas cities that made election law
changes immediately after Shelby County: Pasadena, Beaumont, and Galveston. These
three cities also have “a long, well-documented history of discrimination” affecting the
rights of minority voters and would have been subject to Section 5 preclearance. 88 After
Shelby County, each city adopted or attempted to adopt a redistricting plan without
federal oversight. Independent plaintiffs challenged these laws, alleging the election
changes have discriminatory effects on minority voters. The following is an analysis of
which challenges worked for these cities, and recommendations for what can be done to
improve Section 2 litigation.
A.

Pasadena

Pasadena is a city located within the greater Houston metropolitan area, with a
population of approximately 150,000.89 Approximately 55% of Pasadena is white, 33% is
Latino, and 13% is African-American, while the remaining population identifies as
American Indian, Alaska Native, or other race. 90 Shortly after the Shelby County
decision, Pasadena enacted an at-large voting system for its City Council.91 This at-large
plan changed the election map from eight single-member districts to six single-member
districts and two at-large representatives. 92 Latino voters challenged the at-large election
plan under Section 2 of the VRA and the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas invalidated the plan, finding it had a discriminatory impact on minority voters.93
1.

Pasadena Before Shelby County

Pasadena has a long history of acting with discriminatory intent, both generally and
specifically surrounding voting practices.94 According to an expert report presented to the
Southern District of Texas Court, “Latinos continue to lag behind politically and
economically in the face of persistent racial prejudice and a structure of
discrimination.”95 This discrimination extends back to at least the 1800s, when Tejanos
(the Spanish word for Texan used to describe Latino settlers) established a legitimate
87

League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 439–40 (2006) (quoting Vera v. Richards,
861 F.Supp. 1304, 1317 (S.D. Tex. 1994)).
88
Id.
89
QuickFacts: Pasadena City, Texas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/4856000 (last updated July 1, 2018).
90
About Pasadena, CITY OF PASADENA, https://www.cityofpasadena.net/about-pasadena/ (last visited May
19, 2019).
91
See Patino v. City of Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667, 673 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
92
Id.
93
Id. at 724–25.
94
See generally Mike Snyder, Voting Rights Case Part of Long History of Pasadena Ethnic Strife, HOUS.
CHRON., http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/columnists/greater-houston/article/Voting-rights-casepart-of-long-history-of-9178135.php (last updated Aug. 22, 2016, 7:19 PM).
95
Report of Andrés Tijerina at 3, Patino v. City of Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667 (S.D. Tex. 2016) (No.
138-1).

359

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2019

Texas government but were soon outnumbered by Anglo Americans. 96 Around this time,
Pasadena was growing and attracted a vibrant working Latino population. But a shift in
the mid- to late-twentieth century set the stage for increased voter dilution. As the white
population of Pasadena declined slowly, the Latino population grew by 50% in the late
1900s.97 As demonstrated below, the strong conservative values of the blue-collar white
workers became more problematic and volatile in the following decades.
By the 1980s, Pasadena was the headquarters of the Texas Ku Klux Klan and
politicians were pushing to keep the white voters in power, despite the changing
demographics.98 At this time, Pasadena had an at-large voting system, which was not
uncommon in Texas. Approximately 85% of large Texas cities used at-large systems
through the 1980s.99 As the city grew, Pasadena maintained its at-large district scheme
and the majority of the city was still white. 100 However, as the Latino population
expanded, they fought for equal representation in elections. In the 1990s, Pasadena
Latinos filed a lawsuit under Section 2 of the VRA, claiming that the at-large system for
electing the school board denied Latinos the opportunity for equal representation in
school board elections.101 Although the judge found the plaintiffs could not prove that
their votes were diluted, this case illustrates that the city’s minority population was
struggling to find their voice in political representation.102
Pasadena also has a history of diluting minority votes that predates Shelby
County.103 For example, officials previously discarded ballots from Latino citizens before
they could be counted. 104 Pasadena also used color-coded ballots to distinguish white
voters from minority voters.105 In fact, federal reports found that some white officials
were not even aware that their actions were discriminatory because it was simply the
norm.106 This was not the only Pasadena voting practice that had discriminatory effects;
Latino citizens were routinely required to show identification before voting and often
were told they could not vote, without any explanation provided.107
Today, Latinos make up approximately 62% of Pasadena, a significant increase
from 48% in 2000.108 With a growing Latino population, one would expect to see more
Latino-favored candidates in power in Pasadena. However, actions taken after Shelby
County suggest there may be continued discriminatory intent to dilute the voting power
of Latinos. For instance, in 2011, Pasadena’s City Council adopted a redistricting map
that created eight districts. 109 Half of these districts were “majority Spanish-surname
96

Id. at 4.
Id. at 29.
98
Id. at 29–30.
99
Id. at 33.
100
Id.
101
Perez v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 165 F.3d 368, 369 (5th Cir. 1999).
102
See id. at 374.
103
See Report of Andrés Tijerina, supra note 95, at 35.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 50.
107
Id.
108
Sen. Sylvia Garcia & Larry Peacock, Redistricting Proposal Targets Hispanic Gains, CHRON.,
http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/Garcia-Peacock-Redistricting-proposal-targets-4947300.php
(last updated Nov. 1 2013, 5:23 PM).
109
Patino v. City of Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667, 681 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
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registered-voter districts” and the other half were majority Anglo registered-voter
districts.”110 The city only held one election using this map in May 2013—just under two
months before Shelby County.111 In the May 2013 election, Latinos, voting as a bloc,
elected their preferred candidates in three of the four districts that were Latinomajority.112
2.

After Shelby County: Pasadena’s At-Large Election System

Two days after Shelby County, Pasadena Mayor Johnny Isbell 113 called for a
committee hearing for an upcoming November 2013 special election. He proposed a
redistricting plan that disproportionately affected the influence of Latino voters in
municipal government. 114 This plan cut two of the eight seats from Pasadena’s city
council, creating six single-member districts and two at-large seats (the “6-2 plan”). If
Section 5 were in place, Pasadena would have been required to submit this plan to the
DOJ and it likely would have been blocked.115
While the committee rejected the at-large plan, Mayor Isbell nevertheless moved
ahead with the proposal.116 Isbell brought the plan to the City Council in August 2013,
where it was put to a vote.117 Mayor Isbell cast the tie-breaking vote, resulting in citizens
of Pasadena voting on the plan in a November 2013 special election. 118 In the special
election, voters narrowly approved (by only seventy-nine votes) an amendment changing
the districts from eight districts (8-0) to six districts with two at-large districts (6-2).119
The two eliminated districts were predominantly Latino,120 who make up approximately
50% of the voting population in Pasadena. 121 Almost every Latino who voted in the
special election opposed the new districting plan; approximately 99.6% of Latinos
rejected the plan.122 However, the redistricting plan was passed, possibly due to low voter

110

Id.
Id.
112
Id. at 706. Although a white-preferred candidate won one of the four districts, the three Latino-preferred
candidates testified that due to “District B’s strong majority of Latino citizen voting-age population and
Spanish-surnamed registered voters, the District was likely to elect a Latino-preferred candidate in” future
elections. Id. Further, the district court found “that Mayor Isbell and the Pasadena City Council believed
this as well.” Id.
113
Mayor Johnny Isbell has been actively involved in Pasadena politics for over thirty years. His second
term ended in 2017, and he cannot run again due to term-limit laws. Id. at 678.
114
See id. at 681.
115
See LOPEZ, supra note 45, at 4.
116
See Patino, 230 F. Supp. 3d at 681.
117
See id.
118
See id. at 682.
119
See id.; see also Alvaro Ortiz, Five Hispanics Sue the Pasadena City Counsel, Municipal Districts
Redesign, CHRON., https://www.chron.com/neighborhood/pasadena-news/article/Five-Hispanics-sue-thePasadena-City-Council-5890631.php (last updated 12:56 PM, Nov. 13, 2014).
120
Ari Berman, Voter Suppression Backfires in North Carolina, Spreads in Texas, THE NATION (Nov. 7,
2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/voter-suppression-backfires-north-carolina-spreads-texas/.
121
See Patino, 230 F. Supp. 3d at 686. The court cites two different surveys and both estimate that the
Latino citizen voting-age population is around fifty percent. See id. at 686–87.
122
Id. at 669.
111
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turnout.123 In the following 2015 election, the 6-2 plan was utilized, which resulted in one
less Latino-majority single-member district than previously under the 8-0 single member
district plan.124
Pasadena Latinos of voting age, along with the Mexican American Legal Defense
and Education Fund, filed a lawsuit against the City of Pasadena, alleging the
redistricting plan resulted in Latino vote dilution.125 On January 6, 2017, the Southern
District of Texas found that the election change diluted Latino voting strength and
violated the VRA.126 The court analyzed the case under the Section 2 two-step analysis
outlined in Gingles. 127 Again, the first step is establishing a prima facie case of vote
dilution—both parties agreed that the first two conditions of the Gingles step one were
satisfied. 128 These two conditions are that the minority is both large and geographically
compact so that they could comprise a majority of the voters in a district and the minority
group is politically cohesive, meaning the group votes as a bloc.129
The third condition to establish the prima facie case—that majority votes as a bloc
to defeat the minority preferences—was also met.130 Representing nearly half of voting
eligible citizens, Latinos should have proportional representation and should have been
able to elect four of the eight representatives. Yet, in all elections considered by the court,
“Anglo or other non-Latino bloc voting usually defeated the Latino-preferred
candidate.”131 Under the old 8-0 plan, eligible Latino voters were the majority in four
districts; but under the new 6-2 plan, they were the majority in only three districts.132
Further, Latinos were nearly the majority in a fifth district under the 8-0 plan, meaning
they could very well be the majority in most districts in the near future. 133 If Latino
candidates of choice win the majority of votes in a fifth district, Mayor Isbell would no
longer have the deciding vote when the City Council was split between Latino-majority
districts and white-majority districts. 134 The court found this change, “by simple
arithmetic,” constituted dilution.135
Since the first Gingles step establishing a prima facie case of vote dilution was met,
the court then moved onto the second step, 136 which requires courts to consider the
“totality of the circumstances.” 137 Taking Pasadena’s history of discrimination into
account, Latinos suffered lingering effects that prevented them from full involvement in
123

See Ortiz, supra note 119. Out of a city of over 150,000 people, only 6,429 people voted on this
measure. Id.
124
See Patino, 230 F. Supp. 3d at 709.
125
Id. at 671, 673.
126
Id. at 674. The court also held that the at-large plan violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
Id.
127
See id. at 675; see also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986).
128
Patino, 230 F. Supp. 3d at 709.
129
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50–51.
130
See id. at 51; Patino, 230 F. Supp. 3d at 713.
131
Patino, 230 F. Supp. 3d at 694.
132
Id. at 710.
133
See Kira Lerner, Voters Sue Texas Town for Diluting Hispanic Vote, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 5, 2015,
8:04 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/voters-sue-texas-town-for-diluting-hispanic-vote-40af01178ab8.
134
See id.
135
Patino, 230 F. Supp. 3d at 710.
136
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986).
137
Id. at 46.
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the political process. 138 Latino success in Pasadena politics was slow, but they have
gained victories in recent years. Under the 8-0 district map, two Latino candidates won,
while only two Latino candidates were ever elected before 2009. 139 Only one Latino
candidate was elected under the 6-2 plan.140 It is important to note that one reason for the
lack of Latino candidates and Latino victories is low Latino voter turnout, and many
scholars attribute low minority voter turnout to years of discriminatory actions.141
Under a “totality of the circumstances”142 test set out in Section 2, the court found
that the at-large plan had a discriminatory effect on the voting strength of Pasadena
Latinos. 143 The court said that the extensive history of discrimination in Pasadena
provided a framework for analyzing this new plan.144 This history weighed in favor of the
plaintiffs because Latinos had been systematically prevented from participating in
Pasadena elections. 145 Pasadena’s elections were also racially polarized, evidenced by
“Anglo bloc voting usually defeat[ing] Latino preferences in districts in which Latinos do
not make up the majority of citizen voting-age population . . . .”146 Perhaps one of the
most critical pieces of evidence was the reduction in proportionality that occurred as a
result of the redistricting plan. The court emphasized that the move from the 8-0 plan to
6-2 plan reduced the number of Latino-majority districts from four to three.147 In other
words, Latinos were the majority in 50% of the districts before Shelby County, but were
the majority in only 38% of the districts after Shelby County. Given the fact that Latinos
make up approximately 50% of the voting population, “that is dilution.”148
The court ordered Pasadena officials to gain preclearance under Section 5. 149
Although Section 5 is no longer automatically applied to governments with a
discriminatory past, judges do have the authority to require districts to obtain
preclearance from the DOJ prior to making any election changes. 150 Because the voters
successfully proved that Pasadena acted with intent to discriminate under Section 2, the
court required Pasadena to gain preclearance under Section 5 prior to making election
changes for at least five years.151 This relief is significant because for at least the next
five years, Pasadena voters no longer need to rely on bringing Section 2 claims against
the city. Instead, the government must seek preclearance prior to enacting any changes.

138

See Patino, 230 F. Supp. 3d at 710–11.
See id. at 715.
140
See id.
141
See generally WALDMAN, supra note 63.
142
52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2012); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50–51.
143
Patino, 230 F. Supp. 3d at 718.
144
Id. at 718–19.
145
See id.
146
Id. at 714.
147
See id. at 710.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 729–30.
150
See id. Under § 3(c), a federal court may “order a jurisdiction to obtain the Justice Department’s
preclearance of its election changes under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act.” Id. at 729. Plaintiffs should also
bring a § 3(c) request to require preclearance for the government action they are challenging under § 2.
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See id. at 729–30.
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Why Latino Voters were Successful in Pasadena

Pasadena certainly has “a long, well-documented history of discrimination that has
touched upon the rights of [Latinos] to register, to vote, or to participate otherwise in the
electoral process.”152 The Pasadena government wasted no time after Shelby County. In
an interview with SCOTUSblog, Mayor Isbell said that he proposed the district map
immediately after Shelby County “because the Justice Department can no longer tell
Pasadena what to do.”153 Without VRA preclearance protection, Latino voters turned to
Section 2 for protection.154 While there are many reasons why the court found Isbell’s
plan violated Section 2 of the VRA, the court’s focus on the pervasive nature of local
discrimination was critical to the Latino voters’ success. There are two key factors that
contributed to the success of Latino voters in Patino v. Pasadena. First, the court
considered the disparate impact of the new plan within the context of the greater history
of discrimination Latinos have faced in Pasadena, as well as in Texas more broadly.
Second, the court relied on evidence of intentional discrimination, enabling Latino voters
to find broader relief.
The court could have ended its analysis of the third condition of Gingles step one
by finding that Latinos made up the majority of voters in four districts under the 8-0 plan
and they were only the majority in three districts under Isbell’s plan. 155 However, the
analysis continued and the court also considered Pasadena’s discrimination in the context
of this dilution.156 For example, the City argued that two Latino-preferred candidates won
under the new plan. 157 But this was not persuasive because both Latino-preferred
candidates had Anglo surnames, which the evidence suggested significantly helped their
campaigns.158 The court said, “If Latinos in Pasadena can – barely – elect their candidates
of choice only if those candidates are incumbents with Anglo surnames, then Latinos in
those districts do not have an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice.”159
Second, the court separated its Section 2 analysis from the intentional
discrimination claim. In doing so, the Latino voters were given a broader remedy. The
Latino voters did not need to prove intentional discrimination for the court to find that
Pasadena violated Section 2 of the VRA.160 The court found that Pasadena did act with
discriminatory intent in diluting Latino votes because “the intent was to delay the day
when Latinos would make up enough of Pasadena’s voters to have an equal opportunity
to elect Latino-preferred candidates to a majority of City Council seats.” 161 Under the
original 8-0 plan, the day when Latinos could elect the majority of City Council seats
152

League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 439–40 (2006).
Patino, 230 F. Supp. 3d at 698.
154
See id. at 674.
155
See id. at 710.The court did make this finding, holding that Latinos were the majority in “one fewer than
under the single-member district plan, and that is dilution.” Id.
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See id.
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See id. at 711.
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See id.
159
Id. at 712.
160
See id. at 718–19. “Courts need not reach a finding on intentional discrimination unless ‘the remedy to
which Plaintiffs would be entitled for a discriminatory intent violation is potentially broader than the
remedy the district court may fashion for the discriminatory impact violation.’ ” Id. (quoting Veasey v.
Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 230 n.11 (5th Cir. 2016)).
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Id. at 725.
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would have been in 2015.162 The Anglo majority acted with intent to delay this outcome
by changing the voting districts.163 In addition to correcting the Section 2 violation and
requiring that Pasadena conduct its next City Council elections using the 8-0 plan, the
court also ordered all future plans to undergo preclearance. 164 This broader remedy was
possible because the court considered the intentional discrimination claim in addition to
the Section 2 claim, bolstering the plaintiff’s Section 2 claim.165
Patino v. Pasadena is a model for voters fighting discriminatory voting practices
at the local level after Shelby County. However, it is important to recognize that the
voters likely prevailed because of the strength of their evidence of intentional
discrimination. Section 2 “was designed to prohibit voting rules and restrictions that not
only have a disparate impact on minorities but also interact with current and past patterns
of discrimination and continuing inequalities to cause that disparate impact.” 166 While
Section 2 claims can be litigated without proving intentional discrimination, evidence of
discriminatory intent can strengthen the voters’ claims and provides the opportunity for
greater relief. Without the protection of Section 5, governments like Pasadena are able to
implement discriminatory election laws, despite their history of discriminatory voting
practices. Until the preclearance protection under the VRA is reestablished, voters should
look to Pasadena as an example of how to successfully bring Section 2 litigation.
B.

Beaumont

Beaumont—another Texas jurisdiction with a long history of discriminatory voting
practices—enacted an at-large system for electing the school board which the DOJ had
previously blocked.167 Unlike Pasadena, there are more black citizens than white citizens
in Beaumont.168 Beaumont’s racial tensions culminated in a battle for the Independent
School District Board of Trustees. Before Shelby County, white conservatives tried to
take the board back from a black–controlled majority, but this move was blocked by the
DOJ. After Shelby County, the white conservatives tried a new approach that likely
would have been prohibited under Section 5. However, a Texas court found this new plan
permissible under Texas law.
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See id.
See id.
164
Id. at 730–31.
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See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 441 (2006) (finding that evidence of
intentional discrimination weighed in favor of the voters’ claims against Texas).
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Danielle Lang & J. Gerald Hebert, A Post-Shelby Strategy: Exposing Discriminatory Intent in Voting
Rights Litigation, 127 YALE L.J. F. 779, 793 (2018).
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Thomas E. Perez, Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Assistant Attorney Gen., Voting Determination Letter
(Dec. 21, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/crt/voting-determination-letter-41.
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See generally Patrick Michels, Race to the Bottom: How Beaumont’s Racial Divisions Created the Most
Dysfunctional School District in Texas, TEX. OBSERVER (Nov. 14, 2014, 8:00 AM CST),
https://www.texasobserver.org/beaumont-isd-race-to-the-bottom; Zachary Roth, Breaking Black: The
Right-Wing Plot to Split a School Board, MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/blacks-texas-town-fearreturn-old-days (last updated Jan. 30, 2014, 2:06 PM).
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Beaumont Before Shelby County

One of the most pervasive illustrations of Beaumont’s discrimination is within the
Beaumont Independent School District (BISD). Beaumont public schools remained
segregated well after Brown v. Board of Education. 169 In 1964, a court declared that
Beaumont’s school segregation was unconstitutional and approved a desegregation
plan.170 In a report on school desegregation eighteen years after Brown, the United States
Department of Health, Education & Welfare found that Beaumont failed to comply with
constitutionally mandated desegregation standards. 171 Even after courts found that
“freedom of choice” plans were inadequate repairs for segregation, Beaumont continued
using this plan.172
Beaumont’s segregated schools were also very clearly unequal. One all-black high
school was intended to hold 500 students, but hosted over 1000 students in the 1970s.173
Students complained of rats, cockroaches, and outdated heating and plumbing systems.174
While white schools received new books, black schools only received the leftovers. 175
Students protested the inequality.176 The Beaumont black community lacked faith in the
school board, for “the actions of ‘their’ school board have given them little reason to
believe things will be different in Beaumont.” 177 Today, BISD continues to perpetrate
inequality through the BISD Board of Trustees. In 1985, a federal judge created seven
single-member districts after the DOJ found that Beaumont’s previous plan of five singlemember districts and two at-large districts diluted black votes. 178 Under this singledistrict plan, black voters had the opportunity to elect up to four minority-preferred
members to the Board.179
In 2011, the city voted to replace two of the seven districts with “at-large”
representatives; white voters overwhelmingly voted in favor of the proposal while black
voters rejected it.180 White voters attempted to remove the four-person black majority by
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creating at-large districts.181 After voters narrowly approved the proposal, the Beaumont
government submitted it to the DOJ for review. 182 The DOJ blocked this plan under
Section 5 of the VRA because they found the 5-2 plan would reduce minority voters’
political power in Beaumont.183 Using statistical evidence, the DOJ found that Beaumont
suffered from extreme racial polarization.184 The DOJ also found that white voters were
overall unwilling to support a black-preferred candidate.185 In order to enact the 5-2 plan
in a nondiscriminatory manner, Beaumont would need to draw five districts so that three
candidates elected would be the choice of black voters, and provide sufficient evidence to
prove that the at-large system would not hinder the success of a black-supported
candidate.186 Beaumont failed to provide this evidence in 2012.187
After the DOJ blocked the 5-2 plan, supporters of the plan tried other methods to
prevent black-preferred candidates from winning.188 In February 2013, BISD adjusted the
existing districts based on the 2010 Census and staggered the terms of these districts.189
In a unique and unprecedented move, white conservatives submitted their candidate
filings for board positions, declaring their intent to run for the three districts that were not
up for reelection. 190 The incumbents of these three districts rightfully believed their seats
were safe for the May 2013 election, as their terms were not set to expire until 2015. 191
The school district rejected the white challengers’ paperwork, so the voters sued.
In March 2013, a Texas judge allowed the three white conservative candidates to
effectively replace three black members on the board.192 The conservatives argued that
board members have to run after a redistricting and that the black incumbents were
ineligible for running against the conservatives because they did not file for reelection.193 The judge allowed the white conservatives to run unopposed.194 One month
later, the DOJ intervened under its Section 5 authority.195 They found this practice had
discriminatory effects on black voters because the terms of three black-preferred
181
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representatives would be cut short; the three white conservatives had all run previously
and none of them had gained more than 10.9% of black voters’ support.196 Furthermore,
the March 2013 decision was made after the candidate filing period closed, precluding
those who relied on the original policies from filing. 197 As a result, Beaumont
rescheduled its election from May 2013 to November 2013.198
2.

After Shelby County

Just months after the DOJ found that BISD election practices violated Section 5,
Shelby County nullified Section 5 and Beaumont immediately reinstated the 5-2 voting
scheme.199 In August 2013, the District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed a
suit over preclearance of the 5-2 plan because the preclearance litigation pertained to the
May 2013 election.200 The federal court no longer had jurisdiction over the case, finding
that it was “a matter of Texas election law.”201 A Texas state trial court ruled that BISD
could move forward with the 5-2 plan in the November 2013 election.202 Litigation over
whether Beaumont could use the 5-2 plan in the November 2013 election reached the
Texas Court of Appeals in October 2013.203
The appellate court found that the 5-2 voting scheme was permissible.204 The court
held that Section 5 was no longer the appropriate governing law because Shelby County
prevented federal oversight.205 Texas state law provides that a trial court cannot “enjoin
an election ordered by a co-equal branch of government, even if that election is subject to
being later determined that it was in violation of Texas law.” 206 Therefore, the court
found that the 5-2 voting scheme was permissible, but allowed the black incumbents to
file for re-election.207
3.

Outcome

Ultimately, the November 2013 election was canceled. The BISD was under the
close supervision of the Texas Education Agency, which intervened because it found the
election was chaotic and tainted by corruption. 208 The legal battle continued for months,
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and voters raised challenges under Section 2.209 Even though the 5-2 plan was not used in
the 2013 election, Beaumont officials were ready to move forward with a voting plan
similar to the one blocked by the DOJ for having discriminatory effects. 210 The DOJ gave
Beaumont guidelines on how to improve the plan and, to their credit, the BISD attempted
to comply. 211 However, the DOJ lost their Section 5 authority before they issued a
determination letter on whether BISD had met its burden to remove all discriminatory
effects. The Texas state court did not rule on whether the plan had either discriminatory
effects or purpose because the burden was now on voters to bring a Section 2 claim.212
However, because the election was cancelled, voters were unable to bring their Section 2
claim against the government.
Beaumont voters may have succeeded on a Section 2 claim following the model
used by Pasadena’s Latino voters. First, Beaumont voters could likely prove the 5-2 plan
had a disparate impact in the context of this city’s history of racial discrimination.
Beaumont voters could also likely prove the 5-2 plan also had a disparate impact on
minority voters. After all, the DOJ found the 5-2 plan had discriminatory effects because
the new election cut the black-preferred representatives’ terms short and the new plan
was implemented after the candidate filing period closed. 213 Additionally, the white
conservative candidates had historically run and failed, and never gained more than 10%
of black voters’ support.214 The DOJ also established that Beaumont suffers from extreme
racial polarization.215 Utilizing this evidence, voters likely could have proven disparate
impact and that the 5-2 plan diluted black votes. Beaumont’s unique history of racial
discrimination in schools should have bolstered that claim. Moreover, voters had
evidence of intentional discrimination, which could have strengthened the Section 2
claim. While the intentional discrimination claim may have been more challenging to
prove in Beaumont than in Pasadena, it is likely that the city could have succeeded. If
Beaumont voters were successful on this claim, the court may have ordered Beaumont to
submit future plans to the DOJ for preclearance, thus protecting minority voters from
dilution. By pursuing this relief, Beaumont voters could have the added protection of
federal oversight in their election process.
C.

Galveston

Galveston—an island off the coast of Texas—has a similarly long history of
diluting minority votes. Galveston’s minority population fluctuates, but for the past
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twenty years has remained approximately 50% to 60% white. 216 The other half of the
county is primarily Latino and black. 217 Historically, Galveston attempted to enact
numerous voting rights changes that violated the VRA, but the Attorney General
prevented these plans from coming to fruition using Section 5 preclearance
requirements. 218 Galveston also attempted to change the voting system from singledistrict members to at-large schemes multiple times before Shelby County. 219 Shortly
after Shelby County was decided, Galveston rushed to change its voting system to one
that the DOJ had previously declared discriminatory.220
1.

Galveston Before Shelby County

Galveston has attempted to dilute minority votes throughout its history. Before
1992, Galveston elected one mayor and six councilmembers through an at-large
election.221 Minority plaintiffs filed an action against the city of Galveston claiming this
at-large scheme violated Section 2 of the VRA. 222 Galveston officials then sought
preclearance under Section 5.223 Fortunately, the DOJ found their voting system violated
Section 5, forcing Galveston to change to a single-member district plan.224
In 1998, Galveston again attempted to change their city council composition from
six single-member districts to four single-member districts and two at-large
representatives.225 At this time, the city was approximately 28% black and 21% Latino.226
The DOJ found the change would dilute minority votes, given that two of the six singlemember districts had black majorities who had elected black representatives to the
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Galveston city council in the past. 227 Eliminating two of the six districts would
significantly reduce the impact of minority votes.
Again in 2011, Galveston had eight single-member districts and it attempted to
enact a 4-2-1 plan, where the city council would have four single-member districts, two
at-large districts, and one mayor voted at large.228 This plan was similar to the one the
DOJ blocked in 1998, therefore Galveston requested that the DOJ rescind their 1998
determination letter.229 According to the 2010 Census, Galveston’s black population had
decreased to 19% and its Latino population had increased to 31%.230 The DOJ found that
the plan would have a retrogressive effect on minority voting strength and therefore
violated the VRA.231 The VRA prohibits election laws with discriminatory effect, but
Section 5 also prohibits changes that cause retrogressive effects on racial minorities.232
On October 3, 2011, the DOJ refused to grant approval for Galveston’s proposal.233
On October 14, 2011, Galveston submitted another plan to the DOJ, seeking
preclearance.234 As noted earlier, Section 5 of the VRA requires the Attorney General to
respond within sixty days of a jurisdiction submitting a letter, either approving or
rejecting the new plan. 235 One month after Galveston submitted this plan, Galveston
voters and elected officials brought a lawsuit against the county, alleging that this plan
should be judicially declared unconstitutional because Galveston did not request
preclearance in a timely manner.236 The DOJ did not make a preclearance determination
before the deadline for filing to run for office for the next election passed.237
The Southern District of Texas ruled that they could not make a decision until the
Attorney General’s sixty days lapsed because the DOJ had authority over this Section 5
claim.238 However, the court issued an injunction in favor of the plaintiffs until the DOJ
responded, allowing any person who wanted to run for a position to do so under the
unapproved plan, “with the understanding that if the U.S. Department of Justice . . .
disallow[s] preclearance by the end of the day on December 15, 2011, their filing fees
will be refunded, and this three-judge court will determine what temporary remedy to
adopt at that time.”239 The DOJ finally issued a formal objection to the redistricting plans
in 2012.240 Again in 2013, the DOJ found that Galveston voters did not seem to vote
along racial lines in the mayoral election.241 However, the DOJ also stated that this was

227

Perez, supra note 221, at 2.
Id. at 1.
229
Id. at 2.
230
Id. at 1.
231
See id. at 4.
232
See 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012); see also Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (noting that an
important purpose of § 5 is to prevent laws with retrogressive effects on minorities).
233
See generally Perez, supra note 221, at 4.
234
Petteway v. Henry, No. 11-511, 2011 WL 6148674, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2011).
235
52 U.S.C § 10304 (2012).
236
See Petteway, 2011 WL 6148674, at *1.
237
See id.
238
See id. at *2.
239
Id. at *3.
240
See Petteway v. Henry, 738 F.3d 132, 136 (5th Cir. 2013).
241
Petteway, 2011 WL 6148674, at *1.
228

371

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2019

unusual for Galveston, as the city typically did vote along racial lines. 242 The DOJ found
that moving to the mixed single-member and at-large election system “would lead to a
retrogression in minority voting strength prohibited by Section 5.” 243 This conflict in
Galveston seemed to quiet down—until Shelby County removed the preclearance
requirement.
2.

Galveston After Shelby County

The same year Shelby County was decided, Galveston moved to re-enact the
redistricting map the DOJ had previously rejected due to discriminatory effects. In
August 2013, Galveston “adopted a map for Justice of the Peace Districts that reduced
the number of Justice of the Peace districts from eight to four.”244 There are some slight
differences between the August 2013 map and the map denied by the DOJ. Yet voters
alleged the boundary revisions would still pose a significant challenge to a minoritypreferred candidate to be elected in three of the four new districts because the slight
changes to the boundaries did not negate the discriminatory impact of the at-large
elections.245
In response to these changes, minority plaintiffs attempted to bring a lawsuit under
Section 2 of the VRA.246 The plaintiffs alleged that the 2013 redistricting maps were
“hastily conceived and . . . adopted with minimum public input.”247 Under the totality of
the circumstances, the plaintiffs asserted that minority voters would be “denied an equal
opportunity to participate effectively in the political process” with the new at-large
plan. 248 The plaintiffs requested a temporary restraining order and injunction. 249
However, the Section 2 claim was unsuccessful and the temporary restraining order was
vacated. 250 This meant that Galveston could move forward with its redistricting plan,
despite the DOJ’s prior finding of retrogressive effects. 251 The plaintiffs appealed and all
parties swiftly worked with one another to ensure that Galveston had a working map for
their election.252 After “direct discussions with the DOJ in an attempt speedily to obtain
preclearance for a new set of maps,” the County and Plaintiffs agreed to revert back to
the 2001 map.253 While it is true that the County’s plans were not able to take effect, the
court failed to fully address the plaintiffs’ Section 2 claim.254
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It is important to again note that Section 2 does not protect minorities against
retrogressive effects, as Section 5 does. 255 This means that minority plaintiffs in
Galveston faced an uphill battle to bring a successful Section 2 claim without relying on
the retrogressive effects the plan would have on minority voters. Though this may be a
factor in a judge’s consideration of the totality of circumstances, evidence of
retrogression is not sufficient to warrant a judicial decision in favor of the plaintiffs.
Without Section 5, minority voters in Galveston are susceptible to election law changes
that may lead to negative and retrogressive effects. The only reason they were able to
convince a court to revert back to the 2001 plan was because of lengthy, time consuming
litigation that required the DOJ to step in anyway.
3.

Outcome

Shelby County significantly impacted the strength of minority voters in Galveston
County. As black and Latino populations were making gains in Galveston, officials
enacted a plan that the DOJ found had negative effects on minority population.256 Before
2012, Galveston received numerous Voter Determination Letters from the DOJ that
prevented Galveston officials from creating at-large voting districts.257 Two months after
the Supreme Court struck down the preclearance requirement in Shelby County,
Galveston moved forward with these plans. 258 Though there has not been any proven
discriminatory intent from Galveston officials, the discriminatory effects should be
sufficient to suggest voting violations.
The state court should have considered Galveston’s history of discrimination.
Within this context, the court could also have considered the retrogressive effects of the
plan. Although the Pasadena court did not explicitly consider the retrogressive effects of
the redistricting plan, the fact that the court considered the new plan through the lens of
the city’s history of discrimination essentially allowed the court to see how the plan
would have retrogressive effects. If the court had considered Galveston’s history of
discrimination in this case, it then should have found a remedy for the retrogressive
effects of the new plan under Section 2.
CONCLUSION
Without the DOJ’s ability to proactively prevent discriminatory voting laws,
minorities in local jurisdictions are at serious risk of voter dilution. Proving a claim under
Section 2 of the VRA is significantly more challenging than proving a Section 5 claim,
largely due to the fact that Section 2 claims are brought after the law is enacted. Section 2
claims are also expensive and time consuming. 259 Voting rights litigation is not only
255
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cumbersome for the litigants, but for the courts as well.260 As Representative John Lewis
put it, the only costs that Section 5 imposes on states “is the paper, postage and
manpower required to send copies of legislation to the federal government for review,
hardly a punishment.”261 Without Section 5’s preventative measures, voters are currently
at a significant disadvantage.
Pasadena, Beaumont, and Galveston all implemented at-large elections following
Shelby County, which led to intense litigation lasting for years in some instances. Within
just a few months of the Supreme Court’s holding that the coverage formula of the VRA
was outdated, each of these cities moved forward with plans that had discriminatory
effects on minority voters. The cities all had a long history of voter discrimination and
had unsuccessfully tried to pass similar legislation before Shelby County. Minority voters
in counties with similar discriminatory pasts are at risk for voter dilution. Since Section 2
claims are difficult and expensive to litigate, minority voters will continue to suffer
serious repercussions of Shelby County v. Holder at the local level. Until Congress
revives Section 5 and the coverage formula in 4(b), voters challenging local practices
should use Patino v. City of Pasadena as a guide for successful Section 2 litigation.
These case studies highlight the difficulties of bringing Section 2 claims,
suggesting that the rights of minority voters are most at risk at the local level.
Challenging legislation after it goes into effect is an uphill battle and is a particularly
difficult one for people fighting at local levels that are not drawing national attention.
These battles take a lot of effort and resources, so it seems logical that seemingly smaller
voting violations will be overlooked. At-large elections are going to continue to have
discriminatory effects at local levels. Without federal oversight and protection, minority
voters are continually at risk for losing legal battles against local counties redistricting to
create at-large elections. Section 2 cannot take the place of Section 5, but until the
preclearance requirement is restored for municipalities with a discriminatory past, voters
must rely on it. Until then, minority voters should look to Pasadena as an example of how
to bring a successful Section 2 claim against a government that inappropriately enacted
an at-large election scheme.
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